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The Mobilisation of the European Left
in the early st Century ()
E     ’           landscape has undergone spectacular
changes at the turn of the new century. The June  elections for the
European Parliament confirmed changes in political dynamics that
emerged at the  European elections and persisted through sub-
sequent elections in EU member states. Beyond national idiosyncrasies,
four trends have shaped the current political environment on the
continent: the rise of support for far-right formations, electoral victories
of centre-right parties, the ideological shift of some traditional centre-
left parties to the right, and a relative decrease of electoral support for
radical and orthodox left-wing formations (). The last European elec-
tions seem to have consolidated these trends into shared, trans-
European phenomena: the centre-Right has become a dominant politi-
cal force, far-right populism has established its lasting presence, electoral
support to the radical-Left is steadily diminishing, while support for the
centre-Left is faltering.
Collectively, these occurrences have produced a profound crisis in
the Left’s political perspective. This has placed the European Left,
() This work was initiated as a study
conducted for the United European Left/
Nordic Green group of the European Par-
liament in view of the European elections forth-
coming in June . I would like to
acknowledge my gratitude to the team of the
Hoover Chair for Social and Economic Ethics
(Headed by Philippe van Parijs) of the Catho-
lic University of Louvain for providing a
medium for discussion in the early stages of
work. I am also grateful for the stimulating
feedback I received from Claus Offe, (Hum-
boldt University, Berlin), Jean Laponce (Uni-
versity of British Columbia), Chris Bertram
(University of Bristol), Ira Katznelson
(Columbia University, New York), and Arthur
Mitzman (Amsterdam University) on earlier
drafts. Their honest commentary gave vigour
to my writing efforts, while I remain responsi-
ble for the ultimate content and organization of
the ideas in this work.
() An analysis of the recent shifts in the
left-right political alignment in Europe in
support of my thesis of the emergence of new
political cultures in Europe appears in
Contemporary Politics, ().. The cur-
rent work takes up and extends this thesis,
explores some of the sociological roots of the
change, and considers its implications for the
political mobilization of the European Left.

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in its broad spectrum of political formations, at a point of reflection
on its current predicament and its future: Is the perceived crisis of the
Left caused by a temporary concurrence of events, or does it have
its roots in lasting socio-economic shifts to which the Left is extrane-
ous?
On the basis of the latest rounds of elections held in the fifteen ‘‘old’’
member-states of the European Union (before its enlargement in May
), the present study attempts to discern significant peculiarities in
the electoral mobilisation of the Left and offer an insight into the way in
which recent social changes throughout Europe are affecting political
discourse and voting behaviour. In exploring the causes of the Left’s
decline we will consider the combination of longer-term (structural)
factors and short term ones (electoral mobilisation), which have
influenced societal support for the Left in recent years. This will lead us
to the contention that, rather than a stable re-alignment in favour of the
Right, the latest sequences of elections in Europe gave expression to
protest against the system of governance (the state) and of policy-
making (the parties) that had become the norm in European Welfare
States after the Second World War. Further, the analysis will advance
the hypothesis that this critical vote is part of a larger and more stable
transformation in which the left-right alignment along economic policies
is being challenged by the emergence of a new fault-line shaped by the
security-risk dilemma of the neo-liberal knowledge economy. We will
argue that the Left’s incapacity for coherent ideological and organisa-
tional mobilisation is rooted in its failure to adjust to this emerging ali-
gnment. Eventually, we will seek to identify a new conceptual core for
the Left’s vision in the new century.
. Electoral dynamics in Europe at the beginning of the century:
a right-wing re-alignment?
Despite the initial blow which the collapse of state socialism in
Eastern and Central Europe inflicted on left-wing ideologies and on
the status of left-wing political formations (), the last decade of the
() The model of West European Socialism
was in crisis before the collapse of communism
and the end of the Cold War. Social democrats,
in Donald’s Sassoon’s account of the history
of Socialism in Europe, had already lost faith
in traditional social democracy in the s
and embraced the ethos of the market (Sassoon
, pp. -). For an analysis of the
decline of social democracy in the s from
the perspective of political sociology see Kit-
 

th century saw the triumph of centre-left parties throughout the
European Union. Thirteen of the fifteen EU member states had socialist
governments by the late s. The exceptions were Spain, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Ireland (). In contrast, the recent political dynamics
in Europe seem to be marked by the Left’s decline: by mid-, the
four left-wing governments — those of Britain, Germany, Sweden and
Spain — represent an exception, rather than the rule.
The  elections for the European Parliament already signalled a
general tendency of decline in voter support for the Left and a parallel
increase of support for the Right. This led to the Socialists losing their
dominant position in the European Parliament to the Christian Demo-
crats and Conservatives of the European People’s Party at a time when
left-wing parties dominated national politics in most EU member states.
As national politics are usually the main considerations for voters in
European elections (Guyomarch , p. ), the  elections for the
European Parliament were indicative of the onset of a right-wing shift in
electoral preferences throughout Europe.
Indeed, the last rounds of general elections in EU members brought
a series of shifts to the right (as featured in the table in Annex ). Seven
of the fifteen EU governments (Denmark, France, Portugal, Italy,
Netherlands, Austria, Greece) shifted in composition from centre-left
to centre-right. Internal shifts to the right within the ruling rainbow
coalitions occurred in four of them (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Finland). By early , only three EU member-states had
preserved the dominance of centre-left parties in government: Britain,
Germany and Sweden. No shift took place from right to left in the
formation of national governments before March , when the
Spanish Socialists won a surprise victory over the incumbent centre-
right Popular Party.
schelt (). The collapse of state socialism in
Central and Eastern Europe provoked a crisis
in left-wing ideologies in the classical Greek
sense implying a catharsis: it prompted an
effort at overcoming doctrinal Marxism which
enhanced the standing of left-wing parties and
helped them improve their performance in
electoral politics — which accounts for much
of the ascent of the Left in the s.
() Yet these countries were hardly a strong-
hold of right-wing politics in that period.
Before the Spanish centre-right Popular Party
formed a minority government in , the
Socialist Party had maintained an undivided
rule for  years (since ). Between 
and  the centre-right Christian Democrats
ruled in coalition with the Socialists headed by
Jean-Luc Dehaene. Although the right-wing
Liberals have been the largest political family
in Belgium since , the centrist blue-green
coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialist
(co-authors of the Belgian welfare state) has
been the usual governmental formula in Bel-
gium for the past -some years. Similarly,
until  Luxemburg was traditionally
governed by a red-green-blue coalition. Only
the Irish centre-right Fianna Fàil has had a
stable dominance in national politics in the
s (consult table in Annex ).
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With the Spanish (relative) exception (), the shift to the right
deepened in three out of the four countries that did not have left-
wing governments in the late s — Belgium, Ireland and Luxem-
bourg. Where the ascendancy of left-wing parties was pre-
served — Britain, Germany, Sweden and, until March , Greece —
this was largely due to an internal shift to the right in the parties’ policy
orientation, embracing a formula of social liberalism in the style
of British New Labour’s ‘‘Third Way’’ (). Most recent scores at
local elections in Britain and Germany, as well as results from the June
 European Elections, testify to a rapid decline in support for
centre-left incumbents here. Electoral losses for the Left were also
registered at these elections in the majority of the new EU member
states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus, Latvia
and Slovenia.
The latest European Elections confirmed the dominant place of the
centre-right: the EPP-ED political group in the European Parliament
gained the highest percentage of seats, and the share of the Liberals
(ELDR) rose. To this is added the stable performance of far-right for-
mations: despite a drop in support for the far-right parties in Austria,
France and the Netherlands (a tendency countered by Greece’s far-
Right scoring its first electoral success in  years, and the rising vote in
favour of the Flaams Blok in Belgium), right-wing populism has found a
stable representation in the European Parliament, enhanced by the
populist vote in many of the new member states (such as the League of
Polish Families). Against the increased voter support for right-wing
formations, the overall support to left-wing parties at the European
elections decreased: the vote for the Socialist political group continued
to drop, while the alternative left and green formations (the EUL/NGL
and Greens/EFA) saw their share significantly diminish despite the
strong showing of Germany’s ex-communist Party of Democratic
() The March  general elections in
Spain re-affirmed the mandate of the centre-
Right Popular Party of José Mar’a Aznar,
which in  had formed a minority govern-
ment. These elections for the first time brou-
ght a majority victory for a centre-Right party
in contemporary Spain, and were a serious
blow to the Socialists and the Communists.
The Socialists (PSOE) lost over a million votes
from the previous election (seats in parliament
dropped from  to ) — the party’s lowest
vote and seat totals since . The United
Left (Izquierda Unida) lost over  per cent of
the vote and finished with only  seats. In the
 general elections, the Popular Party had
had a comfortable lead in the polls before the
terrorist attacks in Madrid three days prior to
elections instigated a sharp reversal in public
support.
() The choice of the term ‘‘Third Way’’ for
the new policy constellation betrays a remar-
kable lack of historical memory on the part of
political leaders who adopted this notion: the
concept was first used by the German Nazis to
distinguish their ideological and policy plat-




Socialism (). Overall, the presence of right-wing formations in the
new European Parliament significantly outnumbers that of left-wing
ones. It is also worth nothing the phenomenal electoral gains of euro-
sceptic parties (such as the British Independence Party, Hungary’s
Fidesz and Sweden’s June List), as well as fringe formations (such as
Holland’s Transparent Europe, or the Austrian vote for Hans-Peter
Martin).
Despite the electoral gains of the centre-Left in France, Spain,
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Belgium at the last European elections,
the series of shifts to the right in the course of the past five years — both
in terms of electoral support and in the structures of governance at
national and European level — seem to indicate a relatively stable
change in voters’ preferences and, consequently, a re-alignment in
favour of the Right. More significant even is the particular distribution
of voter preferences, with the backdrop of rising abstention rates — the
shift to the right, combined with a rise of support to non-mainstream
parties is a pattern which emerged at the  European elections,
recurred at most national elections in EU member-states since, and was
confirmed by the June European elections.
Surely, the historical perspective of some five years within which
these changes occurred is too compressed to establish with certainty
whether we are at a turning point in the electoral fortunes of social
democracy. For this, of course, we need to study trends of participation
over a longer period (). Yet, the sheer geographic scope of the changes
— the fact that shifts to the right (in governments’ composition, policies
and ideological discourse) have occurred in all EU member states — is
sufficiently suggestive of a trans-European phenomenon that merits an
attempt at diagnosis.
() Between the  and  European
Elections the combined vote for the Left
dropped by %, while that for the Right rose
by .%. Within the Left, the vote
for the Socialist group decreased, while
that of the alternative left (EUL-NGL
group) increased. At the  elections,
the vote for the Socialist group dropped
further by .%, the vote for the European
Greens—European Free Alliance (GRE-EFA)
fell by %, and that for the European United
Left—Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL)
decreased by .%. Source: European Parlia-
ment (http: //www. europarl.eu.int).
() For a historical interpretivist analysis of
the left-wing formations’ evolution in the th
century see, for example, Bartolini (), Eley
(), Sassoon (, ). For the political
sociology of changes within the left-right ali-
gnment in the late th century see Kitschelt
(, ), Knutsen (), Kriesi (),
Mann (), Manza (), Offe (). For
analysis of these issues from the perspective of
social and political philosophy see Laponce
(), Giddens ().
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. Interpreting the shift to the right: the protest vote hypothesis
How should these similarities in changes in the composition
of national governance across Europe since  be interpreted? Are
they symptomatic, as it seems, of a sharp, and potentially durable re-
alignment in favour of the Right?
There is no sufficient evidence to support a hypothesis of a stable
shift to the right in voters’ preferences. Comparative results from the last
two rounds of national elections show that, at least numerically, the
left-right balance throughout Europe has not been significantly disturb-
ed (Consult charts - in Annex II). Remarkably, a discrepancy between
governmental shift to the right and popular support for the left can be
observed in the majority of member states (). This discrepancy invali-
dates the thesis of stable re-alignment in favour of the Right. Quantative
indicators (levels of electoral support, or average losses between conse-
cutive elections) provide unsteady ground for the analysis of this phe-
nomenon. To be able to understand the nature of the recent electoral
dynamics in Europe, electoral outcomes should be examined in the light
of public and political responses to the evolution of the Welfare State, as
precisely this evolution has been the backdrop of political mobilisation
in recent years.
a) The political culture of the welfare state consensus
The post-war Welfare State consensus in Europe was supported as
much by the centrist nature of European conservatism, as it was by the
strong leverage of organised labour. Recent ideological shifts of socialist
parties to the right would only seem to confirm and strengthen the
consensual centrism on which the Welfare State is founded. However, it
() To take France as the most drastic case
of discrepancy between governmental shift to
the right and popular support for the Left:
despite the apparent collapse of the French
Left in last year’s presidential and legislative
elections, surveys do not register a significant
shift in left-right alignment. Approached
numerically, the overall left vote was larger
than the right vote with . per cent to .
per cent in the first round of presidential elec-
tions. Therefore, it is likely that the last round
of presidential and parliamentary elections in
France represent a case of deviating elections:
the specific circumstances of the rise of elec-
toral support for Le Pen allowed the centre-
right to triumph. The hypothesis of deviating
elections in the case of France’s turn to the
right is additionally confirmed by the March
 local elections when the Left gained .
per cent of the vote against  per cent for the




is this very consensus and the style of politics it generated, more than the
alleged unsustainability of its economic and social policies, which has
eroded the Welfare State as a form of relationship between citizens and
governments ().
Decades of conservative-socialist governmental cohabitation, and the
continuing loss of ideological distinctions between centre-left and
centre-right brought about professionalized political establishments
marked by a style of politics based on elite policy-making, compromise
and consensus, increased bureaucratisation, absence of political debate
or involvement of civil society. Throughout Europe, ruling establish-
ments were discredited by mismanagement and corruption scandals in
the s.
Of further support of the protest vote hypothesis is the fact that the
defeat of incumbent parties at the turn of the century (before the eco-
nomic slowdown of the past two years) was carried out in conditions of
good economic growth and low unemployment. Despite the extraordi-
nary prosperity that Europeans enjoyed in the late nineties, the sense of
anxiety and insecurity at the everyday level was steadily growing,
paralleled by a general loss of confidence in governments. Despite eco-
nomic growth, problems with the health system, schools, public trans-
portation, as well as growing urban violence, intensified. Populist lea-
ders made a link between the failure of some groups to become
integrated into society and crime, and managed to mobilise widespread
social dissatisfaction with an administrative model of consensus buil-
ding and avoiding conflict at the price of escaping political responsibi-
lity.
In that sense, the tumbling of political incumbents in Europe in the
late s, combined with increased support for far-right parties, can be
seen as a vote of non-confidence equally for the centre-left and centre-
right establishments that had dominated the political scene since the
Second World War. Rather than a genuinely right vote, this was a vote
against a certain style of old consensus politics void of clear principles
and marked by privatisation of the public interest and short-term
expediency.
() We will confine our analysis only to the
issue of the political culture which the
consensus politics of the Welfare State gene-
rated. A detailed analysis of the social tensions
and transformation of the post-war Welfare
State in Europe is not feasible here. For such
an analysis see Offe (, ), Rosanvallon
(), Kitschelt (). Some of the literature
on the postmodern shift also examine policy
reactions to this shift: see Inglehart (,
).
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b) The crisis of electoral politics
Two particular signals further support the notion of the recent vote
in national and European elections as a protest one, rather than as a sign
of a stable re-alignment to the right: the persistent decline in voter
turnout and the rise of support to non-mainstream political forma-
tions.
Researchers have repeatedly noted a long-term decline in people’s
trust in institutions over the past three decades.
The thesis that low turnout is indicative of a tacit revolt or, alterna-
tively, of civic alienation is not, however, uncontested. Low turnout is a
likely outcome of a change in the significance attributed to party sys-
tems, which is part of a broader change in the way people perceive the
role of the citizen in democracy: fewer and fewer people regard voting as
a civil duty or an effective instrument for influencing the political agenda
and, instead, turn towards forms of ‘‘elite changing action’’
— unconventional political participation, petitions, boycotts (this phe-
nomenon was analysed more than two decades ago by the authors of
Political Action, see Barnes et al. ). In that hypothesis, declining
electoral participation is not an unequivocal sign of civil alienation, but
of a shift in what citizens perceive as valuable and efficient channels for
political input. Indeed, non-electoral political mobilisation — from
protest movements to special interest lobbying — is steadily on the
increase (Catterberg and Inglehart ). Theorists of postmoderniza-
tion see this increase in direct civic action as part of the larger value shift
in contemporary Western societies towards post-material values (see
Inglehart , , ; Abramson and Inglehart ; Beck
).
The protest vote hypothesis finds additional support in the fact that
in many European countries unconventional parties have lately become
the beneficiaries of the above-described discontent with mainstream
politicians and entrenched political hierarchies, or discontent with
politics, altogether. The quest for new political culture prompted the
development of new parties or movements (such as the White March
movement in Belgium, Attack in France, the Margherita alliance in
Italy, or Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal), or the re-foundation and
‘‘renewal’’ of existing parties. The June  elections gave fresh evi-
dence against the right-realignment hypothesis and in favour of a protest
vote interpretation: In countries where the demand for political
accountability could be channelled through new political formations
 

(the Dutch Transparent Europe party or the vote for Hans-Peter Martin
in Austria), the vote for previously successful far-right parties signifi-
cantly dropped ().
The emergence of non-mainstream political formations in the new
accession countries (such as the Polish Self Defence, or the League of
Polish Families) also supports the thesis of the incapacity of established
political systems to respond to new public demands. The rise of new
parties is all the more significant because it goes against the trend of
small parties’ terminal decline in increasingly bipolarised political sys-
tems.
The protest vote at the beginning of the century — embodied
simultaneously in the rebuff of incumbents, the rising support of fringe
parties, and the growing abstention rates — expresses a growing demand
throughout European publics for a new political style of governance and
a change of policy priorities to address new themes such as ethical issues,
accountability, physical safety and economic stability. Thus, although at
first sight it appears that concerns with order and security draw voters to
the right, it is more likely that the protest vote was cast against the
complacency of the political establishments and the incapacity of
enacted policies to confront the changing social realities in Europe. The
electoral dynamics in the past five years indicate a growing demand
throughout European publics for a new political style of governance and
a change in policy priorities to address new themes such as ethical issues,
democracy, stability and openness. These changes of European publics’
political sensitivities seems to bode well with the thesis that value
priorities within the advanced industrial societies have shifted from
‘‘materialist values’’ emphasising physiological sustenance and safety, to
‘‘post-materialist values’’ prioritising human rights, self-esteem and
individual expression (Inglehart , b, , ), as well as a
shift from class-based politics to quality-of-life politics (Inglehart and
Rabier ). However, as our consecutive analysis will demonstrate,
postmaterialist theory fails to convey the nature of the social transi-
() In Austria, Hans-Peter Martin, who
exposed MEP’s benefits, won  per cent of
the vote. Jorg Haider’s anti-immigration,
far-right Freedom Party slid to . per cent
from . per cent and lost four of its five seats.
Source of electoral data: Bundesministerium
des Inneren (http: //www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen).
In the Netherlands, Paul van Buitenen’s
Transparent Europe party won two of the
twenty-seven Dutch seats on a platform to
purge fraud and waste in the European Union.
Mr. Van Buitenen was the European Com-
mission official who revealed a network of
nepotism and financial irregularities, which
ultimately caused the resignation of the Santer
college of commissioners in . The
extreme-right Pim Fortuyn List, which in
 concentrated the protest vote, did not
pass the bar for representation at the European
Parliament. Source of electoral data: Politiken
(http: //www.politiken.dk).
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tion which is currently at the root of the emergent political culture in
Europe.
. Critical re-alignment beyond left and right
The preceding analysis established that the shifts to right-wing rule
in Europe do not necessarily indicate a long-term electoral advantage for
the right. Neither was the vote a simple gesture of protest against left-
wing political establishments. Although, as electoral results show,
numerically the left-right balance is not disturbed, it is the very left-right
divide which is becoming obscured. We are witnessing an end of left-
right ideological vectors, driven by capital-versus-labour dynamics, and
stretching from the pole of free enterprise to that of (re)distribution.
It was only after the Second World War that the left-right divide
started to be based primarily on the issues of free enterprise and state
control of the economy. This constellation lasted until recently. A
number of studies in the last two decades have begun to observe new
shifts in the basis of political alignment (Evans et al. ; Giddens
; Inglehart and Rabier ; Inglehart and Welzel ; Kriesi
; Kitschelt ; Knutsen ). Postmaterialist theory, for exam-
ple, has contended that the old left-right cleavage in party politics has
lost much of its validity since the s due to the increasing importance
of non-economic values and the transition from class-based politics to
quality of life politics (Inglehart ; Knutsen ) ().
From a different perspective, Jean Laponce () has contended
that, as a result of continuous changes within the political cultures of the
Left and the Right, the only stable core element of the left-right
contrasts now seems to be ‘‘power that be’’ on the right and ‘‘the weak’’
on the left, with ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’ being a spatial translation of
‘‘up-down’’ in the distribution of political power. Yet, as we will argue in
what follows, the national elections across Europe at the turn of the
century not only confirm the erosion of the left-right continuum, but
also contain signs of the appearance of new fault-lines in politics that the
left-versus-right division can no longer accommodate.
() For the opposite view, namely that we
have not left the capitalist mode of production
with postmodernity and therefore we should
seek explanation of the political and social
impact of globalization at the level of
production-related class and not at the level of
state or culture (a view shared by the author
of this analysis), see Ashley (); in the
same vain, though not in terms of post-
modernization, see Offe ().
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Apart from being a protest vote against the centre-left and centre-
right political establishment, the most recent elections seem to indicate a
more radical, structural change in Europe’s political cultures, deepening
the crisis of left-right ideological identifications through the appearance
of new vectors of political alignment. This change could be approached
through the perspective of what, after the work of Key and Burnham,
has become known as critical elections: elections that mark a sudden, con-
siderable and lasting realignment in the electorate and lead to building
of new electoral majorities (Key , , , ; Burnham ;
Evans and Norris ) (). Realignment is provoked by rapid social
and economic changes that forge new political coalitions. This carries
significant consequences for the party order in a long-term perspective,
as well as for the general process of governance: realignment implies
changes in the social basis of party support, as well as in the ideological
basis of party competition (orientations towards parties change as the
parties themselves come to represent emergent social groups), and finds
expression in the new thematic composition of campaigning. It further
incurs a change in the policy agenda of national political formations and
elites beyond electoral campaigning. In that sense, critical elections
affect a profound change in the essence and rationality of politics.
Has Europe undergone such a radical realignment at the turn of the
century? Has a new fault-line appeared in politics? What is the Left’s
place in this re-alignment? Let us now turn to examining the signs of
ideological re-alignment in Europe.
The emerging critical re-alignment is signalled by at least three
phenomena reoccurring at national elections throughout Europe in
recent years: a) changes in the political agenda; b) alternations in the
social background of typical electoral groups associated with the Left
and the Right; and c) the merging of left-wing and right-wing ideolo-
gical programmes.
a) New political agenda
The nature of the agenda of political debate throughout Europe has
changed (both in terms of public sensitivities and official political
discourse), moving beyond the left-right divide of economic policies
() The critical election theories iden-
tify three other election types: deviating
dealignments (marked by a temporary or
sharp reversal), secular realignments (mark-
ed by a gradual strengthening of support
for the party), or secular dealignments (mark-
ed by a progressive weakening in party sup-
port).
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along the poles of free enterprise and redistribution. For the first time in
many years campaigns were no longer centred on taxation and redistri-
bution, but on political and economic insecurity: concerns about risk
have become central political issues.
Characteristic of this shift is the new way in which the issue of
unemployment appears in political discourse: the old paradigm is
concerned with employment in terms of overall growth and efficiency,
while the new one focuses upon unemployment in terms of fear, loss and
marginalization (). In a neo-liberal economy marked by global eco-
nomic competition and downsized labour markets, job insecurity (rather
than unemployment rates) is a form of discontent of a different order
than the standard evaluations of short-term economic performance.
Surveys throughout Europe indicate the growing salience of the safety
agenda: restoration of the rule of law and political ethics have become
public priorities, often overtaking the economic and social agenda. As a
result, right-wing populism stormed onto the political scene in the late
s campaigning to stop new immigration, fight crime and rebuild
neglected public services.
Overall, as a response to these new social trends, a new agenda of
order and anxiety has appeared with four constitutive elements: physical
security, political order, cultural estrangement, and employment insecu-
rity, as the economic component of the mix.
This new stress on security has been interpreted as part of the
post-modern shift: as existential security has become increasingly guar-
anteed people from advanced industrial societies have become more
sensitive to risk (Beck ). With postmodernization the very nature of
risk has changed: the attainment of existential security is followed by
new forms of insecurity, related to quality of life problems (Inglehart
). Yet, to interpret the new concerns with risk as a shift away from
economic concerns to ‘‘quality of life’’ issues is not convincing. On the
one hand, the omission of economics from the agenda of recent electoral
campaigning does not necessarily suggest that economics is not a rele-
vant political issue. Quite the contrary, labour-market reforms have
recently been the focus of policy-making. The marginalisation of these
issues in election campaigning is rather due to the established consensus,
across the ideological spectrum, on necessary reform of the welfare state.
The new security agenda, as outlined earlier, does not fit Beck’s or
Inglehart’s diagnosis of the postmodern shift. In Beck’s account of
contemporary society as ‘‘risk society’’, the distributional conflicts over
‘‘goods’’ (property, income, jobs) that characterised the industrial
() I am grateful to Claus Offe for helping me clarify this point.
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society, have been replaced by distributional conflicts over ‘‘bads’’, such
as the risk of nuclear technology, genetic research or environmental cri-
ses (Beck ). Postmaterialist theory presents this change as part of
the postmodern shift from economic factors to life-style factors as the
main determinant of survival, as a result of which concerns with mate-
rialist values emphasising physiological sustenance and safety give way
to ‘‘post-materialist values prioratising’’ quality of life issues, human
right, self-esteem and individual expression (Inglehart ).
However, the above enumerated four elements of the currently
dominant order-and-safety agenda can hardly be described as post-
materialist and post-economic issues (of identity and rights, or quality-
of-life concerns with the environment). At the core of the new agenda is
a concern with job insecurity (or more generally access to the labor
market) and physical safety. Although employment insecurity is indeed a
form of discontent which is distinctive from ‘‘standard’’ evaluations of
short-term economic performance, in its nature it is an economic, rather
than a ‘‘quality of life’’ issue. As for ‘‘physical safety’’, it does not figure
in the inventory of post-materialist, quality-of-life values (such as free-
dom or a clean environment) which the transition to post-industrial
society makes predominant.
While indeed, the post-materialist agenda of the s and s
gave new impetus to left-wing formations, the order-and-safety agenda
of the early st century is giving momentum to right-wing parties. The
rise of right-wing populism at the turn of the century is now being fol-
lowed by mainstreaming of the extreme-right political agenda: the
Fortuyn, Haider and Le Pen legacy has changed Dutch, Austrian and
French politics by imposing their agenda and pulling all mainstream
parties to the right. Although right-wing populism is currently receding,
public preferences for order and stability do not falter. In fact, it is the
incorporation of the safety discourse into the political rhetoric of
mainstream left- and right-wing parties that explains the withdrawal of
support to right-wing populism, not the diminished relevance of the
security-and-order agenda.
Parties that gained political support in the last few years have been
those which reacted quickly to the new set of socially significant
concerns and managed to articulate a swift (but not necessarily most
adequate) political solution to these issues. The ‘‘order and safety’’ ove-
rhaul of the political agenda generally translated into an increasing
support for right-wing political platforms that put the stress on security
and authority. With safety becoming the core concern (especially for the
urban populations in Europe, which have been the traditional suppor-
      21 

ters of left parties), the anti-establishment reaction fed into an
extreme-right vote. Although right-wing populism is currently rece-
ding, public preferences for order and stability do not falter. In fact, it is
the incorporation of the safety discourse into the political rhetoric of
mainstream leftist and right-wing parties that explains the withdrawal
of electoral support to right-wing populism, not the diminished rele-
vance of the security-and-order agenda.
The reflex of the left-wing political incumbents was to incorporate in
their platform typically right-wing solutions such as prioritising political
safety over both social protection and civil liberties, or market liberali-
sation over employment stability and social security. Due to its pro-
gressive and culturally liberal legacy, the Left has not been able to res-
pond to the changed political agenda dominated by ‘‘order and safety’’
themes. Unlike the far-right formations, their progressivist heritage
prevented traditional left-wing parties from linking political safety,
employment security and cultural openness in a coherent programme.
Typically, leftist parties during the last round of national elections were
silent on such issues as immigration and urban criminality.
Given the silence of traditional left parties on the order-and-security
agenda, there have not been any policy alternatives that address the
theme of insecurity — analysts repeatedly have observed that there have
been few programmatic differences to distinguish between the major
parties at the last rounds of national elections. This has prompted
authors to observe that the opposition between left and right seemed less
clear-cut at the end of the s (Perrineau ).
b) New social composition of constituencies
Differences between centre-left and centre-right are being effaced
not only in terms of ideology and policy but also in terms of societal
alliances and bases of mobilisation. Thus, the traditionally strong link
between Social Democratic/Labour parties and trade unions is rapidly
weakening. (A most striking current example is Germany, which is fol-
lowing in Britain’s path.) The changes in societal alliances are provoked
by the continual disintegration (though not the disappearance) of class
structures throughout the th century — a process further intensified
by the new stage of post-industrial development that Europe entered in
the late s, the social and political bearings of which are currently
surfacing (and which we will address subsequently).
Party politics in the th century was transformed by the organized
working class. Left-wing parties became associated with the urban
 

working class, trade unions and the underpriviledged. As Michael Mann
() has pinpointed, it is specifically industrial development, rather
than simply wage labour, that was the critical factor disposing workers to
support parties of the left. With the decline of the manufacturing
industry, class structures have disintegrated and the workforce has
become individualized. With the decline of the working class associated
with industrialisation, the familiar form of socialism based on an orga-
nised working class has become a thing of the past (Eley ). The rise
of the politics of identity and difference in the late th century has
added a second cleavage in parallel to the economic stratification clea-
vage, thus further fragmenting the organised electoral basis of the Left.
These social dynamics not only contribute to the crisis of the Left, but to
a more general crisis of the left-right political identification.
Also symptomatic of the declining relevance of the left-right divide
in the past five years are the changes in the social composition of elec-
toral constituencies. Thus, surveys of the last French elections indicate
that the typical voter for the Socialists is female, aged -, educated, in
middle or higher management or the civil service, rather than the
quintessential blue-collar male worker. The socio-professional profile of
the Le Pen constituency is working and middle class: male, young (
per cent), blue collar (one in three), unemployed, self-employed and
small traders (Miguet , p. ) (). The Right (such as the Ger-
man CDU or Austrian ÖVP or the three rightist parties forming the
Italian government) has had a more or less firm grip on those strata that
can be appealed to through anti-establishment, anti-foreigner, and
anti-European populism. The far-right vote has been most successful in
areas where it can rely on sub-nationalist mobilisation: Flanders, Nor-
thern Ireland, Spain. However, there seems to be a strong additional
classifier that currently determines voters’ party preferences. As we will
argue later, this classifier is the attitude to employment possibilities
along the risk-opportunity divide that the neo-liberal economy has
brought about.
c) Merging of left and right platforms
A palpable phenomenon signalling the fusion of left- and right-wing
policy agendas is the recent shift of the centre-left to the right. The Left
had abandoned the traditional agenda of socialism already in the s
() There are, unfortunately, no uniform studies of the nature of voter constituencies
throughout Europe.
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and undertook a partial conversion to the ethos of the market. In Donald
Sassoon’s account, the ‘‘neo-revisionism of the late s marked the
second historical reconciliation between socialism and capitalism: the
first, on social-democratic terms, took place after . The second
represented a compromise on the terms set by neo-liberalism’’ (Sassoon
, p. ).
With this shift in agenda, centre-left parties in continental Europe
started to overlap with the centrist position of conservative parties of the
Christian Democrat family. With the exception of Britain, European
conservative parties after the Second World War never completely
embraced laissez-faire capitalism and instead adopted a centrist position
in terms of economic policies. In the period of the social-democratic
hegemony (-) the Right had adopted many of the positions of
the Left (ibid., p. ). With this, Conservative parties in continental
Europe early on occupied the centre of the left-right political spectre.
The exceptional (for Europe) placement of the British Conservative
Party clearly to the right provided the vacant space in the centre of the
left-right alignment that New Labour took in the late s. This could
not be the case in Europe, where the Socialist parties’ move to
the right made them overlap with the Conservatives who had already
taken the centrist space.
The electoral fluctuations and recent policy shifts throughout
Europe, which we described above, provide some, but not sufficient,
grounds for asserting that what we have been witnessing is critical
re-alignment. In the classic version by Key, the term connotes an elec-
tion that decisively alters vectors of partisanship for a long period,
usually lasting at least one generation. These elections shift votes from
one side to the other by two mechanisms: first, by increased turnout that
brings new voters into the system, who are mobilised on a new basis; and
second, by durable shifts in partisanship among established voters.
While critical elections are said to be marked by uncommonly high
turnout rates, turnout in Europe has not increased dramatically and is
often down, and we cannot yet know whether the shifts in partisanship
will prove durable ().
However, even if the recent policy shifts and electoral dynamics have
not (yet?) crystallised into well-articulated critical re-alignment, there is
enough evidence to suggest that at the turn of the century Europe is
entering a new political era. What shapes this new political era is the
emergence of a new fault-line in politics which is starting to exist in
() I am indebted to Ira Katznelson for
pointing out to me the deficiency in seeing




parallel to the traditional left-right alignment and is often opting to
replace it. The challenge for established and new political formations is
to respond adequately and quickly to the on-going changes in the poli-
tical culture of European publics.
. The new political vectors: social roots and political essence
The broad social background of the current changes in political
identification has been the novel socio-economic constellation that
emerged at the end of the twentieth century in all major post-industrial
societies.
A substantial part of the research on the impact of post-industrial
economy on political visions and practices hinges on the idea that cur-
rent socio-political developments are driven by the dramatic post-s
rise in international capital mobility (economic globalization). From this
perspective the contemporary crisis of socialism appears to be a
by-product of the globalization of capitalism and the resulting loss of
the regulatory framework of the national state (Ashley ; Sassoon
, Wallerstein ). Increased economic interdependence since the
s has generated a new push for productivity, which has created a
shift to market liberalism and the intellectual climate in which the Left’s
shift to neo-liberal positions became natural. ‘‘What is new, especially
since the s, is that interdependence has reached such an intensity
that it has thrown into crisis traditional concepts of national politics and
all political parties and ideologies. Socialists have been more affected
than conservatives, because of their essential conviction that politics can
govern the economy. In a global economy, national politics can survive
only at a less ambitious level, although this will not necessarily lead to
the end of major differences in economic policy between Left and
Right’’ (Sassoon , p. ). This perspective leads to the negative
conclusions about the inevitable withering of left-wing policy options.
More recently, Duane Swank () has tried to challenge the thesis that
the dramatic rise in the international mobility of capital pressures elec-
ted governments to roll back the welfare state, arguing that domestic
policy conditions — electoral inclusiveness, social corporatism, autho-
rity centralization, and existing welfare system structure — shape
democratic governments’ responses to capital and trade integration. He
concludes on the optimistic note that there is nothing inevitable in the
retrenchment of the welfare state: democratic processes and national
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institutions are fundamentally important to determining how interna-
tionalization affects domestic policy change. However, the statistics on
which the study is based end in  and , while the consequences
of global capital mobility were really only seen in the s. With this,
the anti-retrenchment thesis becomes a purely normative argument.
Recent policy shifts have shown that in fact there has been a cutback of
the welfare system even in such established welfare states as Germany,
France and Sweden.
While the majority of scholarship stresses the global dimension (a
quantitative criterion) of the new post-industrial wave (and the resulting
loss of national sovereignty over economic policies), a more fruitful
perspective can be achieved by focusing on qualitative aspects of the
economy in contemporary post-industrial societies. This perspective, as
subsequent analysis will attempt to show, will enable the European
Left to replace its present defensive response to the current economic
dynamics with a positive, emancipatory policy vision.
The new economy (the information-technology stage of the post-
industrial, global economies) has induced profound changes in the
organisation of work and lifestyle patterns throughout society. It revo-
lutionized existing social and occupational structures, diversified the
forms of ownership, created new career opportunities and flexible
employment options, which in turn increased personal chances and
choices over lifetime. Under the impact of the new economy ‘‘the tra-
ditional form of work’’ based on full-time employment in a specific
occupation and entailing a ‘‘career pattern over a life cycle’’ is being
eroded away (Castells , p. ). This has led to the appearance of
the ‘‘portfolio person’’, a person without permanent attachment to any
particular occupation or organization (Gray , pp. -, ).
The most significant social impact of the new economy has been the
flexibilisation of existing class distinctions due to increased professional
mobility and proliferation of forms of ownership and tenure within a
person’s lifetime. Throughout the th century, occupational categories,
such as ‘‘blue-collar’’ and ‘‘white-collar’’ workers, had already infused
economic class distinctions. However, the new economy increases the
speed of entry and exit between professional and social groups, thus
putting an end to the relative fixity of personal identity to one occupa-
tional/class group within an adult lifetime. What gains maximum rele-
vance for people is their possibility (and not existing position) of
upward, or risk of downward, mobility. Hence, the increased salience of
the risk-opportunity vectors in politics, which start to exist in parallel




The transition towards the high-tech global post-industrial economy
in the s is replacing the old socialist-conservative consensus on the
Welfare State with a new division along the lines of the opportunity-
versus-risk dilemma of the new economy. In this sense, the Socialists’
shift to the right is symptomatic of a new type of alignment formed
along the themes of employment security and risk, rather than the
capital-labour dynamics of conflict, or the materialist versus quality-
of-life cleavage identified by postmodernization theories.
. The new political constellation
As a result of the political shifts analysed previously, the current
political agenda in Europe is dominated by a fusion between centre-right
and centre-left platforms into a new policy paradigm that combines a
stress on safety and authority (inherited from the traditional political
Right) and an emphasis on economic liberalism and labour flexibility
(the core of Third Way social liberalism).
Therefore, despite preserved differences in political culture, we can
assert that the new policy axis that aligns the old centres and the old
extremes is the opportunity-risk divide of the new economy. On this basis
a realignment is taking place between centre and periphery, between, on
the one hand, the centre-left and centre-right midpoint, and, on the
other, the circumference of far-right and radical-left parties. In this new
alignment, the new centre (a simultaneous shift of the moderate Left
and Right to the centre) becomes one of the poles in the political axis,
embracing the ‘‘opportunity’’ side of the dilemma, while the far-Right
and radical-Left constitute the opposite pole responding to societal fears
of the hazards of the new economy of increased competition and open
borders ().
The old left and right extremes have come to overlap on two policy
lines. First, in their protectionist reaction to economic and social risk.
The far-Right is abandoning its economic liberalist stance and embra-
cing social protectionism (Bastow ). With this, a major policy dif-
ferentiation between the radical-Left and the far-Right is lost. Second,
() The (quasi) novel rhetoric of opportu-
nities and risks has been noted, in varied terms,
by a number of analysts, and it is usually
attributed to globalisation. However, no
connection has been made to political
re-alignment, fostered not so much by globali-
sation, but by the dynamics of the ‘‘new eco-
nomy’’ (Globalisation focuses on the scale,
rather than the quantitative changes of the new
economy).
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the old left and right extremes have come to converge on the basis of
their increasing preference to national, at the expense of international
solidarity. The fear of competition from immigrants on the low-skills
labour market leads the traditional blue-collar constituencies of the
radical-Left to embrace, be it tacitly, a nationalist reaction to global
borders. The main lines of ideological divergence that survive seem to
be of a purely cultural nature: the cultural conservatism of the far-Right
versus the cultural liberalism of the radical-Left.
The appearance of the new opportunity-precarity vectors of align-
ment, however, does not mean that it is culture, rather than economics
(as postmodernism theories would have it), which drives social stratifi-
cation. One’s place in the process of economic production is still (and
probably even more so) ultimately decisive in a person’s social identifi-
cation.
Most significantly for this analysis, the rapid diffusion of information
and communication technologies has incurred changes in work organi-
sation that have created new status cleavages. For certain professional
categories the new economy has meant increased employment oppor-
tunities, rapid career advancement and valuable job flexibility. Indeed,
the pursuit of more than one career in a lifetime is gaining ground
among the younger generations in Europe. Studies show that increasing
numbers of professionals in their s and s are leaving stable well-
paid jobs — not because of the economic downturn but to gain more
control over their lives. This has been beneficial for some of the tradi-
tionally weaker sections of the population, such as mothers, allowing
them the flexibility they needed to combine child-rearing with a career.
Arguably, one of the most apparent social consequences of the glo-
balised high-tech economies is the increase of the middle class: due to
intensified global competition and the decoupling of many corporations,
the weight of small business would be increasing — small owners who
have enriched themselves during the stock market boom and economic
recovery of the late s. Within that hypothesis, the turn to liberalism
would express the preferences of the growing constituency of the mid-
dle class. This would only mean a return towards the pre-Welfare State
constellation of left-right political cultures along the lines of economic
status (the traditional capital-labour vector).
Against this hypothesis lies evidence that, in general, social mobility
has not merely made the middle class larger, but that ‘‘it has destroyed
many of the common elements previously possessed by, or understan-
dable as middle class’’ (Wynne , p. ). The knowledge economy has
made education a prominent identifier: ‘‘Any cultural cleavage within
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the new middle class may relate more to educational level and its cor-
responding effects upon occupational choice than to initial class origin’’
(ibid., p. ).
The new economy has entailed an explosion of inequalities in the
private sector between skilled and unskilled labour, and deepened the
vulnerability of the weakest social segments. In this sense, the polarisa-
tion between rich and poor has recently been transformed into polari-
sation between professional groups who can profit from new opportu-
nities and those who are most affected by the risks. This means that
during the s and at the beginning of the st century occupational
differences are continually being translated into class differentiation,
which in turn invalidates the Third Way’s claim about the disappearance
of class contradictions. Rather than increasing the middle class consti-
tuency, the new economy deepens social differentiation. This new class
differentiation along the lines of career prospects inherent in the new
economy furnishes the two general constituencies of the opportunity-
risk political alignment. Consequently, the Socialist-Conservative
consensus on the Welfare State is evolving into a consensus on the poli-
tics of opportunity (expressed by centre-left and centre-right, Third
Way, parties) versus the fear of risk, embraced by far-right and radical
left formations.
. Consequences of the Third Way makeover
The most recent attempts to adjust policy agendas to the social reality
of the new economy and the related emergence of new public demands
has been the Third Way reformism which some centre-left and centre-
right parties in Europe are increasingly embracing. However, this type
of social liberalism which has indeed helped these parties find their place
in the opportunities-risks axis of the new political alignment has led these
formations to turn a blind eye to issues of structural social injustice.
Deepening structural injustice renders the activation strategies
deployed by Third Way governments irrelevant, and policies that
condition benefits on active job-search, inequitable. Thus, while decla-
ring an ‘‘end of the class struggle’’ the Third Way is obscuring recurrent
sources of structural social injustice.
The social differentiation, and the consequent split in political cul-
tures along an opportunities-risk axis is being further fostered by the
policy responses of Third Way governments (be they centre-left, as in
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Germany and Britain, or centre-right, as in France). The core of the
Third Way policy turn consists in replacing redistribution-oriented,
with employment-oriented, social policy. As a consequence, one of the
most profound socio-economic developments of the past few years
(since the second half of the s) has been the turn to labour market
flexibility, a policy-trend largely and equally embraced by centre-left
and centre-right governments in Europe.
Job flexibility has been embraced as a policy instrument in response
to two different needs: as a reaction to rapid technological changes
throughout the s, and as a tool for reducing unemployment. As a
natural reaction to the dynamics of the knowledge-based economy,
labour markets in the EU are starting to be marked by skilled-labour
shortages, especially in industries producing or making extensive use of
information and communication technology. This has given rise to a
flourishing of career options for highly trained professionals, resulting in
voluntary temporary employment. This form of job flexibility is highly
remunerated and often accompanied by a good safety network, albeit on
a temporary basis. Yet, the benefits of labour flexibility have so far been
reserved for a small stratum of the population. Highly-paid, voluntary
part-time employment has benefited a select section of highly spe-
cialised professionals in their s and s. Studies indicate that the pre-
vailing category of people willing to take career risks are single, male,
aged  to , people close to the peak of their earning potential and on
fast-track careers ().
Overall, the group of highly skilled professionals has benefited from
the emancipatory potential of the new economy: it has brought for them
new opportunities, has enabled them to be flexible in relation to the
process of economic production (through voluntary temporary employ-
ment), thus increasing their choices over life-time.
However, while labour-market flexibility has resulted in an overall
increase in the quality of life of some groups, it has had a negative effect
on other sections of the population. The distribution of the positive and
negative effects of labour flexibility follows traditional class and occu-
pational lines (skilled-unskilled labour), and deepens some traditional
structural inequalities along gender and generational lines, as far as these
overlap with the lines of professional qualifications. In these cases,
introduced in order to reduce the duration of unemployment, job
flexibility has resulted in forms of involuntary temporary employ-
ment () , mostly for low-skilled workers, which tends to be poorly paid
() ‘‘Tempted by a New Direction’’,
Financial Times, Sept. , p. .
() Involuntary part-time workers are
those working less than  hours per week
 
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and not matched with a reliable safety network. Even when successful in
moving large numbers of persons into jobs, activation strategies of
Third Way governments give predominance to this type of temporary
and involuntary part-time employment where workers are not building
career paths. The considerable successes that have been registered in
bringing more people into work in some countries, open up a new
challenge, since some of the individuals ‘‘activated’’ by labour-market
policies have difficulty remaining in employment and moving up job
ladders. Concerns have also been expressed about the ‘‘quality’’ of the
employment relationship — including perceptions of job insecurity, a
rising incidence of non-standard forms of employment (short-term
contracts, temporary jobs, casual employment, etc.) in some countries
and an increased risk of in-work poverty (). Studies also show that the
success of job-activation policies stressing the responsibilisation of the
job-seeker is questionable in a context of economic slowdowns, such as
the one Europe has been experiencing recently (). For this category of
people, the New economy has brought about an increase in social risk,
while reform of labour-market policies has deepened, not reduced, their
dependence on permanent participation in the process of economic
production, which in turns has limited their life-choices and is pro-
gressively reducing their chances of upward mobility.
Deepening social divisions and erosion of the electoral constituency
of the post-Welfare State centrism now puts into question the Third
Way project. With its impending failure, a mass of critical voters is
forming which could become a potential electorate for the ‘‘risk’’ pole of
the new alignment (left- and right-wing populism). It is likely that, in
the next round of elections throughout Europe this large group of voters
will turn towards either a populist right and left-wing agenda, or
embrace a reformed left agenda, wherever available. It is therefore now
critical for the European Left to articulate a reformed agenda which will
allow it to find its place within the new alignment of the early st cen-
tury.
because they could not find a full-time job.
OECD Report: Involuntary Part-Time Wor-
kers, February . Lack of harmonization in
definitions impedes comparison across coun-
tries.
() OECD Employment Outlook .
() ibid.
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. The Left after the Third Way
The Left perspective has been obscured in recent years under the
impact of two developments: the decreasing electoral support for tradi-
tional socialist parties, and the ideological shift to the right endorsed by
Third Way (liberal) reformism.
We identified this apparent decline of the left perspective as part of a
broader socio-economic shift produced by the economic dynamics of
the late th century. Mobility of economic, social and occupational
structures, insecurity of the employment environment, volatility of
political preferences and voting behaviour are the particular forms in
which the transformative process of the early st century finds its
expression. On the level of political cultures, we are witnessing the
emergence of new political vectors along the poles of social opportuni-
ties and risks, which are challenging the established left-right alignment.
The weakening of the impact of the left vote is at least partly due to the
incapacity of the traditional Left to find its place in the current shift of
political cultures along the new axis of alignment. The failure to provide
prompt and coherent response to the recent societal quest for both eco-
nomic security (without sacrificing career opportunity) and political
safety, accounts for much of the remarkable loss of electoral support for
traditional left-wing parties. From this resulted its silence on new issues
of social concern (political safety, immigration), which reflected a gene-
ral ideological confusion that in its turn triggered the structural frag-
mentation of left-wing formations (). Due to this counterproductive
fragmentation, future elections risk being as much about competition
within the Left as against the Right.
While gaining political credit for their swift reaction to shifting social
concerns, both right-wing and Third Way (social liberalism) political
formations have done so at the price of either obscuring social justice
issues (such as adequate social security, gender equality, environmental
responsibility and consumer protection), or guiding political solutions in
the direction of political safety and away from social integration, as in
() Currently, the Left in Italy comprises
at least  formations. It was the plurality of
Left parties in France that was to a great extent
responsible for the downfall of Jospin at the
last presidential elections. Approached purely
numerically, the overall left vote was larger
than the right vote with . to .. Only the
vote outside the Socialist Party, the alternative
Left vote came up to . per cent — more
than sufficient to win presidential elections.
However, this vote was split between  forma-





the cases of the status of immigrants and refugees, or the issue of urban
youth delinquency. What has been lost in the general re-orientation to
the right are issues which have been at the core of left politics in Europe:
a long-term vision for social development beyond considerations of eco-
nomic efficiency, sensitivity to human vulnerability which has previously
enabled industrial democracies to tackle issues of social justice, and an
awareness of the value of collective goods.
The global shift in the political balance to the right which was de-
scribed in this study has created a vacuum in the current political dis-
course which provides an opportunity for rebuilding and mobilising the
European Left around the socially significant issues which have been
abandoned or obscured by the socialist and right-wing incumbents.
This opportunity for mobilisation of the European Left is enforced by
the increasingly negative social results of the rule of Third Way and
conservative parties in recent years.
In terms of electoral mobilisation the transitional nature of the des-
cribed social dynamic translates into two phenomena. First, the link
between parties and electorates based on social class — a link which,
arguably, has been eroding throughout the th century — loses decisive
relevance for electoral mobilisation. Second, as a reaction to the weake-
ning of the class-alignment link, the capacity of parties to address urgent
social concerns becomes the vital criterion in electoral mobilisation,
taking precedence over voters’ ideological orientation or social bac-
kground. This means that the erosion of the class-based foundation of
parties is as much to the advantage of the Left, as it is to its detriment:
the European Left cannot rely as much on its traditional, social class-
aligned electorate. But it can rely on mobilising the volatile voters on the
basis of positive, forward-looking solutions to the socially urgent
concerns of European publics.
The rate of future electoral success of the European left parties,
therefore, will depend in the first place on how well their platforms
address the social concerns within the order-and-safety agenda. It is
puzzling that the Left seems to leave the dominant protectionist
demands to the rightist/nationalist populists, rather than responding to
the challenge by a universalist in nature, Europe-wide policy of social, as
well as cultural, protection (such as a Europeanized Basic Income, for
instance).
Further, the nature of the new socioeconomic dynamics we described
presents the Left with an opportunity to advance a positive and open
platform, in contrast to the reactive and defensive solutions the Right
has so far successfully articulated. The new economy contains two
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potentials for building such a positive policy response. Firstly, it seems
that post-industrial, knowledge-based societies contain an unpreceden-
ted potential for emancipating personal life from economic efficiency
imperatives, and thus offset the commodification of human life ().
Enhanced voluntary job flexibility, when backed by a reliable system of
social protection, can increase both the chances of decommodification
(by decreasing the period of dependency on participation in social pro-
duction), and the opportunities for participatory forms of social justice.
Thus, accommodating people’s choices over lifetime as a particular form
of job flexibility may become one of the cornerstones of the left idea,
replacing the previous concept of reducing inequalities between fixed
categories of population through redistribution. There is also a second
road through which the current socio-economic constellation responds
positively to Marx’s critique of capital-labour dynamics. By increasing
the diversity of forms of capital ownership, the new economy has
created a real opportunity to pre-empt the maldistributive effects of the
market not through the interventionist methods of the Welfare State,
but through diversification of forms of ownership and tenure, such as
joint stock companies co-existing with co-operatives, employee share
ownership schemes and other forms of social ownership etc. (). These
two potentials of the new economy (the emancipatory, anti-productivist
one and the redistributive, ownership-focused one) have not been
effectively explored by Third Way governments, as their social and
economic policies have deepened the unequal distribution of opportu-
nities and risks in European societies.
To find its place within the novel political cultures of Europe, a
reformed Left should thus move beyond the Third Way agenda, gene-
rating a policy programme which links the opportunity potential of the
new economy to a new notion of social solidarity. This, in turn, would
allow the Left to advance a policy framework of anti-productivist and
citizenship-based ideas for social security.
The political transformation towards a new fault-line of left and right
is just beginning. It will depend on the capacity of the Left to overcome
structural weakness and ideological uncertainties to offer a real alterna-
tive to the opportunity-risk divide, an alternative that the volatile, pro-
test vote is now seeking. In trying to find specific policy solutions for the
() Commodification here is understood as
market dependency of needs’ satisfaction. I am
grateful to Philippe van Parijs for helping with
a succinct definition of the term relevant to the
needs of this analysis.
() On ideas of countering inequality
through the diversification of capital owner-
ship see Krouse and Macpherson . I am
grateful to Christopher Bertram (University of
Bristol) for drawing my attention to this aspect
of the prospective agenda of the Left.
 
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tension between opportunities and risks that the new economy imposes
on complex post-Welfare State democracies, a new constellation of the
Left now has a chance to emerge.
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Shifts in electoral support *
and government composition in EU member states: -
C s Early st century.
Austria In its post-war history
through  Austria was
ruled by a ‘‘grand coali-
tion’’ of the centre-left
Social Democrats and the
centre-right People’s Party.
: The far-right Freedom Party
became the second strongest party and
replaced the Social Democrats in the
coalition government. : the People
Party’s biggest electoral success in four
decades. : The Social Democrats
formed a regional coalition with the
Freedom Party.
Belgium The coalition of Christian
Democrats and Socialists
(co-founders of the Belgian
welfare state) has been the
usual ruling formula for the
second half of the th
century. Between  and
 the Christian Demo-
crats ruled in coalition with
the Socialists headed by
Jean-Luc Dehaene.
: Voter support for the Liberals,
(to the right of the Christian Demo-
crats) increased to make them the
dominant party in Belgian govern-
ment. They replaced the Christian
Democrats in the governing coalition.
In Flanders, the vote for the far-right
Vlaams Blok increased, while that for
the Socialists dropped. : The
Vlaams Blok won  per cent of the
Flemish vote, doubling its electoral
results in  years. The biggest
increase of voter support was marked
by the reformed (in the direction of
social liberalism) Flemish Socialists
SPA-SPIRIT, while the two green
parties suffered significant losses. At
the  regional elections the Socia-
lists took the lead in the Walloon
region and in Brussels, while the vote
for the Vlaams Blok rose to make it the
second biggest party in Flanders.
Britain : Labour’s biggest
lead in vote percentage
over the Conservatives
since . The total of
Labour MPs was a post-
war record for any party.
: Labour maintained its lead, yet
shift to the right was registered in the
rising vote to the Liberal Democrats
(.%) — their greatest success since
, a slight rise of the Conservative
vote, and drop in the Labour vote (by
.%). : The regional elections
placed Labour third, after the Conser-
vatives and the Liberals — the worst
electoral score for a governing party at
local elections.
Denmark The Social Democrats
have been the leading party
since .
: The Social Democrats lost to the
right-wing Liberals (Venste) both at
the general and the municipal elec-
tions. Parliamentary majority for the
rightist parties for the first time in 
years.
* Unless otherwise indicated, the data refers to legislative elections.
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Finland In most of its post-war
history Finland was gover-
ned by a core red-green
Social Democratic-Centre
(agrarian, liberal) govern-
ment. In  the Social
Democrats in Finland sco-
red their best post-war
result while the Conserva-
tives had their worst score
for nearly a quarter of a
century. The Finnish for-
mer communist Leftist
Alliance and the Greens
entered government for the
first time.
: The status quo ante of the rain-
bow coalition between the Social
Democrats, Conservatives and the
liberal Centre was preserved. Internal
shift to the right: an increase of the
vote for the centre-right with .% and
an equal drop in support for the
centre-left (Social Democrats and
Leftist Alliance). The Conservatives
made the highest gains of any party
and the Christian League (to the right
of the Conservatives) gained its best
results in  years. : Centre
became Finland’s leading party, while
the Social Democrats came second by a
small margin. The Left Alliance lost
% and  seat in parliament.
France : The Socialist Party
again became the largest
party in Parliament, after
electoral support for it had
been rising throughout the
decade.
: Historical defeat for the Left at
presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions. At the first round of the presi-
dential elections the leader of the far-
right Front National, Jean-Marie Le
Pen, scored his highest victory with
.% of the vote. The Socialist Lio-
nel Jospin lost more than . million
votes over seven years: the worst result
of any Socialist candidate in a presi-
dential election since that of Gaston
Defferre in . The .% for the
Communist candidate Hue was the
party’s worst result since it was foun-
ded. The legislative elections gave an
absolute majority to the centre-right
Union for Presidential Majority. :
the municipal and the European elec-
tions brought a victory for the Socia-
lists.
Germany : The Social Demo-
crats became the largest
party in the Bundestag,
ousting the Christian
Democrats after four terms
in office.
: The German Social Democrats
kept power with only a small margin
over the Christian Democrats and suf-
fered losses at the  state elections,
losing in Lower Saxony for the first
time in  years. The Social Demo-
crats had one of the worst scores in the
party’s post-war history at the 
European and regional elections.
Greece The Panhellenic Socialist
Movement (PASOK) has
been Greece’s ruling party
for most of the county’s
existence as a modern
democracy after . A
tradition of influential lef-
tist political formations:
: PASOK won by a narrow margin
from the centre-right New Demo-
cracy. The vote for the latter rose by
.%, increasing conservative parlia-
mentary representation by  seats.
The vote for the three other main left
formations declined and they lost 
seats. A significant rise of support to
 

the Communist Party is the
third largest party, fol-
lowed by The Coalition of




the far-right at the  regional elec-
tions. : The Christian Democrats
(Nea Democratia) defeated PASSOK
and ensured a comfortable absolute
majority of  seats in parliament.
Ireland The centre-right Fianna
Fàil has had a stable domi-
nance in national politics in
the s.
: Support for Fianna Fáil
increased while the centre-left vote for
Fine Gael and Labour decreased signi-
ficantly.
Italy -: a governing
coalition around the Left
Democrats of R. Prodi, M.
D’Alema and G. Amato.
: Victory for the centre-right
Casa delle Libertà headed by Berlus-
coni. For the first time in Italy’s
democratic history the electorate gave
a large majority to a prospective
government alliance, thus providing
the Right with an unambiguous man-
date.
Luxembourg Traditionally governed by
a red-green-blue coalition
between the Socialists, the
Greens and the centre-
right Christian Social Peo-
ple’s Party (CSV).
: The right-wing Democrats
replaced the Socialists and the Greens
as the coalition partner of the CSV.
The Luxembourg Democrats are the
most right-wing formation in the
European Liberal Democratic and
Reformist Group in the European
Parliament. : The legislatives
confirmed CSV’s leading position,
followed by the Socialists and, with a
narrow margin, by the Democrats.
Netherlands Labour-led governments
(purple coalitions) held
sway in the Netherlands for
most of the last decade. In
 Labor (PvdA) was
able to lead the first
government in modern
Dutch history without the
Christian Democrats.
: A coherently right-wing coali-
tion came to power composed of the
Christian Democrats, List Pim For-
tuyn (far-right) and the Liberals.
Labor lost nearly half its seats in par-
liament to Fortuyn’s party, whose
sudden rise to prominence with .
million votes was unprecedented.
Elections in  checked the extre-
mist vote (the Pim Fortuyn List seats
diminished from  to ), and Labor
recovered its losses, but did not defeat
the Christian Democrats.
Portugal The Socialist Party had
unprecedented dominance
controlling the presidency,
the National Assembly, and
the important town
councils. : The Socia-
list Party had the highest
ever share of vote since
. The Communist vote
rose after  years of elec-
toral decline.
: A steep rise of the centre-right:
the vote for the Social Democratic
Party (to the right of the Socialist
Party) increased by .% to make it
Portugal’s leading party.
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Spain The Socialist Party held an
undivided rule between
 and .
: The centre-right Popular Party
of José Mar’a Aznar formed a minority
government. : The vote for the
Popular Party increased and its man-
date was confirmed. A majority victory
for a centre-right party for the first
time in contemporary Spain. Serious
losses for the Left: The Socialists
(PSOE) lost over a million votes from
previous election (seats in Parliament
dropped from  to ) — the
party’s lowest vote and seat totals since
. The United Left (Izquierda
Unida) lost over % of the vote. :
Victory for the Socialists (.% of the
votes against . for the centre-right.)
Sweden The Social Democrats
have been in power in
Sweden for all but nine of
the past seventy years.
Their partners in coalition
government in the s
were the Party of the Left
(ex-communist) and the
Greens.
: The mandate of the left-wing
coalition was renewed.
Sources of electoral data throughout this study:
European Union: European Parliament (http: //www.europarl.eu.int); Austria: Bundesministe-
rium des Inneren (http: //www.bmi.gv.at/wahlen); Belgium: Official website (http: //verkiezingen
.belgium.be.); Britain: Electoral Commission (http: //www.electoralcommission.org.uk);
Denmark: Politiken (http: //www.politiken.dk); Finland: Tilastokeskus (http: //www.stat.fi/
tk/he/vaalit); France: Ministère de l’Intérieur (http: //www.interieur.gouv.fr; Germany: Bun-
deswahlleiter (http: //www.bundeswahlleiter.de); Greece: Ministry of Interior (http: //www.ypes.
gr/ekloges/content/EN/default.htm; Italy: Ministero dell’Interno (http: //cedweb.mininterno.
it/ind-elez.htm); Ireland: Irish Times (http: //www.ireland.com); Luxembourg: Centre Infor-
matique de l’Etat (http: //www.elections-.lu); Netherlands: NRC Handelsblad (http:
//www.nrc.nl/verkiezingen); Portugal: Comissão Nacional EleiçCes (http: //www.cne.pt); Spain:
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